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preservation." What this really means is that the general public 
does not assign a sufficiently high priority to historic preservation to 
pay taxes for the acquisition of historic buildings through eminent 
domain. Much the same could be said for low-income housing, ac-
cess to privately-owned beaches, or a host of other public facilities. 
Accustomed to a large degree of judicial deference, land use plan-
ners have devised aggressive schemes to compel private landowners 
and developers in effect to finance projects for which taxpayers are 
unwilling to pay. This practice brings to mind Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes' warning that "a strong public desire to improve the 
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a 
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change. "22 
The purpose of the takings clause, as explained by the Supreme 
Court, is to prevent the "government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole." Singling out a handful 
of property owners to carry the expense of providing public facili-
ties and amenities violates the takings clause. Yet this is the effect 
of numerous land use regulations. Indeed, Lang acknowledges that 
New York City's historical landmark law places "an unfair burden 
on the Railroad." A broad understanding of Nollan would, of 
course, curtail the ability of land use planners to achieve ulterior 
purposes through regulation rather than purchase.2J 
Spurred by renewed judicial interest, the dialogue over the con-
stitutional protection of property ownership is likely to continue. 
None of the volumes under review offers the final word, but they do 
illustrate the wide range of perspectives that participants bring to 
the debate. 
THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION. 
By Lucas A. Powe, Jr.1 Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 357. Cloth $29.95. 
Donald M Gillmor 2 
Unreconstructed liberalism shines through this historically ag-
ile, closely reasoned, brightly written and largely satisfying piece of 
22. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
23. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 S. Ct. Rev. 1. 
1. Professor, School of Law and Department of Government, and holder of the Anne 
Green Regents Chair at the University of Texas at Austin. 
2. Silha Professor of Media Ethics and Law, University of Minnesota. 
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legal scholarship. To Powe's credit, he rejects single-explanation 
theories in favor of a "synergy among various explanations for free-
dom of expression that is lost when the discussion deals with the 
strengths and weaknesses of single theory." For this reason the 
works of Harry Kalven, Jr. and Thomas Emerson are appealing to 
him, the work of C. Edwin Baker less so.3 Powe's historical review 
is authoritative.4 His mastery of the case law also is no surprise, 
and the cases are all here, except perhaps for one that deserves more 
than passing mention: O'Brien v. United States,s the draft-card-
burning case. 6 
This review will focus on two aspects of the book. The first is 
Powe's rejection of the "positive liberty" approach to the first 
amendment-that is, the argument that the government should reg-
ulate the press in order to increase the diversity of viewpoints ex-
pressed in our society. The second is Powe's discussion of the 
"negative liberty" of the press-the right of the press to freedom 
from most other forms of government regulation. 
I 
In his American Broadcasting and the First Amendment,1 Powe 
concluded that "the broadcast experience with a regulated First 
Amendment offers the best evidence that a free press must be an 
autonomous press."s In The Fourth Estate and the Constitution, 
Powe extends the paradigm to the print media in a chapter titled 
"The Fourth Estate" -where "editors rather than judges should de-
3. Harry Kalven, Jr., Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America (Harper & 
Row, 1988); Thomas I. Emenon, The System of Freedom of Expression (Random House, 
1970). C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (Oxford U. Press, 1989). 
4. Powe's insights are legion. Our free speech tradition began with an unpopular gov-
ernment. To criticize that government was to be assured vindication by a jury. Prosecutions 
for both seditious libel and contempt of either Congress or the courts were rare after the 
revolution. Today, and so it has been for a long time, it is the critic who is unpopular and the 
government that is popular. Juries in libel suits reflect this simple fact. And is this a building 
block in the foundational premise of those who call for government regulation of the media 
through positive interpretations of the first amendment? 
Prosecuting Eugene Debs, presidential candidate for the Socialist party from 1904 to 
1912, Powe suggests, seems as ridiculous in retrospect as the Nixon Administration prosecut-
ing George McGovern for his speeches against the Vietnam War. The Gulf War may be the 
latest example of how easy it is in times of perceived crisis to check constitutional rights in 
the locker of patriotism and thus misplace the key. 
5. 391 u.s. 367 (1968), 
6. O'Brien ominously thrust into the law of free expression the proposition that if a 
governmental interest is substantial enough, incidental limitations on freedom of speech and 
press are constitutionally acceptable. Emenon viewed the case as a devastating qualification 
on freedom of expression. 
7. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Amencan Broadcasting and the First Amendment (U. Calif. 
Press, 1987). 
8. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 294. 
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cide whether to publish," and where "[G]overnment efforts, from 
whatever source, to block willing dissemination of information 
should be interpreted as barriers to the necessary functioning of the 
press in our democratic society." 
The "Fourth Estate" label tends to suggest that the press func-
tions as a branch of government, something Powe would abhor. It 
may also suggest the function of legitimation rather than the 
"checking" function that Powe, Blasi9 and others have set for the 
press. Powe has something quite different in mind. He uses the 
model to take apart, always respectfully, its antipode, the public's 
"Right to Know." The latter, which may be as much a call for 
eventual accountability to the public as a self-serving "cover for any 
issue facing an embattled and litigious national press," implies a 
journalistic duty that, if neglected, could bring down upon the press 
the wrath of society, a boomerang effect not envisioned by the first 
amendment. 
Powe's foil is Jerome A. Barron, whose landmark 1967 
Harvard Law Review article proposing a right of reply sent shock 
waves through the publishing world that are still being felt today.w 
Shredding the traditional concepts of a marketplace premised on 
the idea of objective truth or a self-governing citizenry, rational and 
keen to vote, Barron, in a burst of legal realism that made him fa-
mous, would have turned the press into a public utility. 
Powe's colorful account-the personalities, the institutions, the 
motivations and emotions-behind Tornillo, 11 the case Barron 
would argue and lose before a unanimous Supreme Court, is worth 
the price of the book. And, in the end, Powe, though he rejects 
Barron's thesis out of hand, sportingly gives him credit for the de-
velopment of op-ed pages in many newspapers. 
Owen Fiss and Judith Lichtenberg12 are added to Powe's list of 
those who would counter the distorting power and wealth of the 
media industry with the facilitative power of government, a "check-
ing" function in reverse. As Barron has been criticized for not con-
sidering how the press would function under his prescript, Powe 
faults Fiss and Lichtenberg for their tenacious monism (failure to 
consider the range of interests served by the first amendment) and 
9. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. Bar 
Found. Res. J. 523, 532. 
10. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press -A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1641 (1967). See also Jerome A. Barron, Freedom of the Press for Whom? The Right 
of Access to Mass Media (Indiana U. Press, 1973). 
II. Miami Herold Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
12. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State? 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1987); Judith Lichtenberg, 
Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press, 16 Phil. and Pub. Alf. 329 (1987). 
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for not considering how a "Mass Media Regulatory Commission" 
(Powe's imaginary horrible) would work. "Neither Fiss nor Lich-
tenberg," he writes, "indicates the slightest awareness of the reali-
ties of government regulation." 
Despite the often shameful record of the press in defending the 
civil liberties of others-and Powe's own observation that Tornillo's 
attorney contacted a hundred newspaper editors in a fruitless effort 
to get the other side of the issue aired-Powe fears government 
more than the power of the media. He believes that "in our plural-
istic society, private power over ideas and information is not mono-
lithic. The power of the federal government can be; that is why it 
may stifle if it wishes." Richard Nixon and Senator John McClel-
lan both warmly supported the idea of a federal reply law. 
And yet something is missing from this analysis. Is the myth 
of the first amendment, putting certain rights beyond the reach of 
majorities, any more powerful than the myth of a self-governing 
citizenry? Could unrestrained corporate power become monolithic? 
Even Chief Justice Warren Burger's terse opinion for the Court in 
Tornillo seemingly accepted Barron's premises about a growing oli-
gopoly of ideas. What if the oligopoly becomes truly monopolistic? 
In the last of his "issues" chapterst3 Powe hints at changes in 
antitrust laws that could constitutionally be applied to the media so 
as to honor Justice Hugo Black's ringing declaration that if govern-
ment cannot impede the free flow of ideas, non-governmental com-
binations must not be permitted to do so either.t4 But Powe, who 
appears to have only lingering fears, leaves it there. While libel, 
prior restraint, and a journalist's privilege to keep the identity of 
sources confidential in the interests of newsgathering lend them-
selves to a Fourth Estate analysis, taxation and joint operating 
agreements (the economics of newspapering) apparently do not. 
Powe might have gone after bigger game. While Barron, Fiss 
and Lichtenberg either fall within the broad liberal spectrum or on 
its edge, some younger legal scholars would reject every overt or 
implied premise in Powe's analysis, beginning with the notion that 
we live in a democratic society. Their purpose is to disrupt an op-
pressive status quo, dismantle the machinery of the established or-
der, and deconstruct the liberal principles that people like Powe live 
by. These are the true intellectual adversaries of a 200-year-old dia-
logue on free speech dominated first by libertarian and now by lib-
eral theorists. Powe, of course, is aware of this. "As to the once 
13. There are four: libel, prior restraints, access to sources and information, and 
antitrust. 
14. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I (1945). 
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universal love of freedom of expression," he writes in his conclu-
sion, " 'it's not that way any more.' The shift from universal sup-
port began, unintentionally and imperceptibly, two decades ago, 
when much of the best constitutional law scholarship focused on 
issues of equality." To his credit, Powe remains staunchly commit-
ted to free expression. 
II 
Much of Powe's discussion is devoted to the constitutional pro-
tection afforded the press from the judicial process itself. In what I 
found to be the least satisfying section of the book, Powe would 
experiment with proposals others have made for the reform of libel 
law, notably his colleague David Anderson's limitation on damages: 
require a plaintiff to prove actual damages and put a cap on "dig-
nity" awards, say of $100,000. 
While Powe appreciates the realities of some of the players in 
libel-the newspaper, which has never admitted error, tracking its 
official game with a constitutional hunting license, and the hourly-
rate media attorney "who can do good while doing well''-he is too 
charitable with plaintiffs. Unfortunately, plaintiffs are not all good 
citizens who would run for public office if it were not for the press. 
They are often liars, cheats and people who would evaporate 
outside the glare of publicity. 
Like those of his predecessors, Powe's remedy treats only the 
symptoms of a litigation virus that may be eating its way toward the 
heart of the first amendment. Given that epidemiology, I wish I 
could agree with Powe that the Westmoreland case precipitated the 
decline of CBS as a network. Unfortunately, that decline began 
many years earlier, although Westmoreland 1s did nothing to im-
prove CBS's image.'6 
Powe's discussion of the issue of prior restraint and its great 
loophole of "national security" is fascinating. D.C. Circuit Judge 
Roger Robb likened the employment of a prior restraint to "riding 
herd on a swarm of bees." By the time the gag is applied the story 
is everywhere. Note Britain's experience with Peter Wright's Spy 
15. Westmoreland v. CBS. Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
16. Burton Benjamin, Fair Play (Harper & Row, 1988). Burton Benjamin, a famous 
documentarist and CBS insider, was employed by CBS to evaluate the Westmoreland "60 
Minutes" story. He found that the network had violated many of its own ethical and profes-
sional guidelines. Ann M. Sperber's colossal biography of Edward R. Morrow (Murrow, His 
Life and Times (Freundlich Books, 1986)) charts the decline of the network's journalistic 
leadership. 
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Catcher, 17 a book purporting to expose huge security gaps in MI-5. 
And yet, prior restraints, or the threat of using them, generate less 
bad publicity for the government than would prosecutions leading 
to the jailing of editors. They are therefore a convenient and tempt-
ing bar to public debate. Powe believes that Erwin Knoll, had he 
ignored the injunction not to publish the "hydrogen bomb" story in 
Progressive magazine, would have been prosecuted under the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, one of only two federal statutes that 
criminalizes mere publication. The other is the Intelligence Identi-
ties Protection Act of 1982. Perhaps such a proceeding eventually 
would have answered questions left unanswered by the landmark 
no-prior-restraint case, Near v. Minnesota. is 
Powe presents diverse views on the prior restraint v. subse-
quent punishment question, the collateral bar rule, and the CIA's 
"licensing" system that leads to the publication of books with as 
many as 168 deletions,19 or to no publication at all. He finally iden-
tifies with what he calls the press's "reflex loathing of prior re-
straints." "Information, even that which legal rules deem of no 
value," writes Powe, "is essential to public debate and potential 
change ... The need to challenge the status quo, and to do so on the 
citizen's rather than the government's terms, provides a continuing 
reason for a special hostility to prior restraints." 
The press should be credited with breaking stories such as 
large-scale CIA operations against the domestic antiwar movement, 
the Abrams M-1 tank fiasco, and the discovery of an immense radar 
system in Siberia that violated treaty obligations-all relevant to na-
tional security and all developed through unauthorized government 
sources. The press has never reconciled itself to Branzburg,2o the 
Supreme Court ruling that denied first amendment protection to 
confidential sources. Perhaps it hasn't had to. The three-part test 
outlined in Justice Potter Stewart's dissent in Branzburg, proposing 
a qualified privilege, has so permeated the common law at both state 
and federal levels that no constitutional protection is needed. In 
one of those rare cases where a dissenting opinion soon overtakes 
the opinion of the Court, the test of (1) no alternative sources, (2) 
relevance, and (3) compelling public need has found favor with 
most journalists. 
While most journalists would agree with Powe that no one 
17. Peter Wright, Spycatcher (Viking Press, 1987). See also, Malcom Turnbull, The Spy 
Catcher Tnal (Salem House, 1989). 
18. 283 u.s. 697 (1931). 
19. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (Knopf, 
1974). 
20. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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should be convicted of a crime because information relating to guilt 
or innocence was withheld by a reporter, they are divided on the 
advisability of "shield" laws. Fearing that governmentally man-
dated special privileges might be the wedge to a regulatory system, 
Powe will go no farther than opt for a status quo ante that he be-
lieves is reflected in both Branzburg and Richmond,21 the latter vali-
dating open courtrooms. His position on a special status for the 
press is as defensible as the counter argument-and both arguments 
continue.22 
III 
The richness of historical allusion, case law, legal theory, polit-
ical events, rational debate, documentation, and just good story-
telling makes this work a model of its genre. Beyond that, Powe 
has set a standard of writing in both of his major works that makes 
them accessible to audiences far wider than those generally com-
manded by legal theorists. The work of Charles Rembar comes to 
mind.23 
And to journalists who are committed to both the rule of law 
and the first amendment there is much comfort in his conclusion 
that "the synergy of text, purpose, history, and ongoing tradition 
have combined to validate an absolute right of press autonomy from 
government in decisions about what and what not to publish." 
As a journalist, this reviewer, however much in Powe's debt, 
cannot help but tease him about his misspelling in both text and 
index of the names of two of America's most eminent journalists-
Lippmann and Sevareid-and for seriously misnaming the Associa-
tion for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication. All of 
which goes to show what a difficult calling journalism really is. 
This is not to suggest for a moment that Powe doesn't under-
stand the ways of the press. He does. His parting words are testi-
mony to that: "The press is an essential ingredient in the 
democratic dialogue in America . . . Its myopia amuses. Its size 
worries; it professes ideals that exceed its very human capacities." 
21. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
22. As far as secrecy is concerned, there are few institutions more secretive than the 
mass media when it comes to their own affairs. Try to get into a newsroom or to find a 
reporter's home phone number or salary. 
23. Charles Rembar, The End of Obscenity; the Trials of Lady Chatterley (Random 
House, 1968). 
